Magersfontein 1899
The
battle of Modder River was fought November 28th, 1899.
Early in the following morning British column crossed the river
unopposed, and was now within twenty-five miles of Kimberley.
Lord Methuen did not feel string enough to resume immediately his
advance.
During the past week his troops had been engaged in three actions,
and ere, he thought, in need of rest; as were also the horses.
The ammunition train was almost empty, and the column required
reinforcements to make up for the 1,000 casualties it has sustained since
leaving Orange River.
De
la Rey’s Genius for War
That the general should have felt it necessary to
halt was unfortunate, delay being more to the enemy’s advantage than to
his own. Has he advanced at
once his troops would have found themselves opposed by a force of Boers
considerably less numerous than themselves-dispirited, moreover disunited,
and only partially entrenched in an ill chosen position.
By December 10th, when the advance was resumed, Cronje
was able to bar their progress with a force nearly as equal to their own
in numbers in a position naturally strong, and well entrenched.
After the battle of Modder River,
the defeated Boers fallback to Jacobsdal, and were joined in the morning
by the Mafeking contingent, which had arrived too late to take part in the
day’s action; and on that same afternoon Cronje moved north to
Spyfontein, where be began to entrench a position along the summits of the
hills.
Reinforcements were now hastening to the Boers, and within a few
days Cronje had nearly 8,000 men under his command, more than twice as
many as he had at Modder River.
On December 2nd De la Rey-to whose military genius the
enemy’s brilliantly conceived dispositions at Modder River were due-came
to the conclusion that the position at Spyfontein was not so strong as was
commonly supposed owing to the ease with which it could be shelled from
the group of hills to the south of it.
He urged Cronje, therefore, to take up a more advanced position at
Magersfontein, his contention being that the British would be compelled to
attack there over flat again open ground.
With some reluctance Cronje yielded to De la Rey’s suggestion,
and on December 4th the Boers abandoned their northern lines,
and began, in full view of the British camp, to entrench a new position.
The most remarkable feature of their defences was a line of
trenches 3 to 4 feet deep, and narrow as a protection against shrapnel
fire, extending, nor along the summit but along the foot of the hills, on
a level with the plain. This
original selection and construction was due to De La Rey.
As De La Rey foresaw, it would be difficult for the British
artillery, even after they had detected where his men were lying to avoid
overshooting the mark, and thus wasting their fire o the hills which rose
abruptly in the rear.
The Boer Position
The Boer position extended
over a front of more than twelve miles.
It was in the shape of a large semicircle, extending from a point a
mile and a half to the north-west of the railway at Merton Siding to Moss
Drift on the Modder River, six miles east, or upstream, of Modder River
station.
When the British advance began, December 10th, the
defences at the extremities were incomplete, they being an after thought
to guard against a turning movement.
The Boer leaders, however, had little doubt but that Lord Methuen
would attack, as he did, at Magersfontein Kop, which lay in the centre and
was the key of the position.
It has
not, we believe, been explained why Lord Methuen did not occupy and
entrench the hills round Magersfontein, immediately after crossing the
Modder river; nor why, when the Boers moved south from Spytfontein, he
took no steps to molest their construction of a new line of defence.
During the twelve days halt, stores and ammunition had been
received in the British camp; and General Wauchope arrived with the 2nd
Black Watch and the 2nd Sea forth Highlanders.
The 12th Lancers, 100 mounted infantry, G Battery R.H.A,
a 4.7 naval gun, the 65th Battery, a balloon section, and the
21st Gordon Highlanders came upon up later.
Lord Methuen had intended to advance up the Modder River to
Brown’s Drift, and then to turn north with a view to outflanking the
Boer position. But later he
decided to deliver a direct attack on the Magersfontein ridge.
Lord Methuen’s Plan
The former plan was apparently
sounder. It would have
involved a flank march across the enemy’s front, but that in itself was
not a serious objection, for the line of march would have been beyond the
range of Cronjes guns; and the only way I which the enemy could have
interfered with it would have been by abandoning their position and giving
battle in the open, for which neither their discipline nor training was
sufficient.
Lord Methuem, however, was anxious to strike a heavy blow at the
Boers at once, and to avoid, if possible, a slow turning movement. The success gained at Belmont moreover had impressed him with
the advantages of a night attack, and he felt confident of being able to
carry Magersfontein Hill in the same manner.
At 3 p.m., December 10th, the Highland brigade under
General Wauchope to whom Lord Methuen entrusted the night attack, moved
forward to a slight rise, four miles north of the camp, known subsequently
as Headquarters Hill; and that same afternoon in the hope of demoralising
the enemy, heavy fire from there greater part of the artillery was
concentrated on the slopes of Magnerfontein hill.
The
Value of Entrenchments
For
an hour and a half cannonade continued.
Large boulders were hurled 50 feet into the air by the bursting
lyddite; whilst the hail of shrapnel threw up the red earth on the
hillside in what looked like jets of flame.
The Boers were well covered in their deep, narrow trenches, and
only three were wounded.
De La Rey could not have wished for a better proof of the value of
his entrenchment, and the small result of the artillery fire inspired the
burghers with confidence, although they realised that the cannonade was
the prelude to an attack.
Under Lord Methuen’s arrangements, general Pole-Carew was to
leave part of the 9th Brigade to guard the camp, and with the
Northumberland Fusiliers and the Northamptonshire Regiment to advance up
the railway and demonstrate against the enemy’s right flank.
The Guards were to move to Headquarters Hill and there remain,
ready to act as a support.
The highland brigade with the cavalry covering its right flank was
to move off half an hour after midnight for the attack; then just before
dawn, to deploy and rich Magerfontein Hill.
General Wauchope undertook his task with reluctance.
He recognised its Hazardous nature, and expressed his doubts of the
chance of success to Lord Methuen. But
once committed to it, he resolved to see it through at all costs, in spite
of the pitiless storm, which began at nightfall.
Soon after 12.30 a.m. the Highland Brigade advanced, guided by
Major Benson, RA. Who had already carefully explored the ground.
The Black Watch led, next came the Seaforths, then the Argyll’s,
and Highland Light infantry. The
Gordon Highlanders had only arrived in camp that evening, and did not move
off till later. The troops
were drawn up in mass of Quarter column, the left guides holding ropes in
order to keep the battalions in formation.
It was a rough night. Rain
had been falling heavily all the evening; and just after the column
started a terrific thunderstorm broke over it, the vivid flashes of
lightning serving to intensity the darkness.
Although drenched to the skin, the Highlanders stumbled cheerfully
on through the murky night over sodden veld.
They were eager to come to grips with the enemy somewhere ahead of
them, somewhere between them and that misty shaft of violet light, which
dipped and rose in the far distance above Kimberley-the De Beer
searchlight.
The advance was very slow slower, owing to the bad weather, than
night marches usually are. Again
and again the troops were halted, so heavy was the going and so rough the
ground; and at 3.30 a.m. when the blackness of the night began to turn to
grey, some distance still intervened between the column and its objective.
Major Benson suggested that the time had come to deploy. But Colonel Wauchope, anxious to keep the troops as long as
possible in a formation, which enabled him to control them, moved on a
little farther. He was
anxious to get within striking distance of the hill at break of dawn.
After, another half mile was gained; then the order to deploy was
given. But at this moment the
Black Watch came on a line of thorny bushes.
To deploy there was difficult, and rather than losing time by
brining back the head of the column the General decided to get the whole
brigade past the obstacle before it deployed.
This necessitated advancing 400 yards farther, but it was
accomplished without mishap, and Wauchope had brought the column within
700 yards of the hull.
He gave the order to deploy. He
knew his men and relied upon them to do their work.
But neither Wauchope nor anyone in his command knew that between
the British and the hill, within 400 yards, was a line of Boer trenches
lined by thousands of eager men, peering intently through the gloom and
listening for the slightest sound that might betray the expected attack.
Daylight was already showing above the hilltops as two leading
companies of the Black Watch began to deploy.
Then the Boers saw them, dim, grey figures in the distance; and a
moment later an appalling hail of lead struck into the serried ranks of
the Highland Brigade. The
troops were not merely surprised; they were caught at a moment when they
were changing from one formation to another.
Death of General Wauchope
The two leading battalions
bravely endeavoured to hasten their extension; then lying down, fixed
bayonets ready for the charge.
But moneymen among the rear companies of the Black Watch, flinching
before that dreadful unseen fire, ran back on the Seaforths still in
column. And as they ran they
infected others with their terror. The
line of bushes, which had arrested the deployment, afforded nearly half
the brigade broke and rushed back in disorder from that storm of bullets
taking such cover as.
On the scene of the disaster, however a steadfast remnant still
remained, lying prone, awaiting the General’s orders.
General Wauchope hurried forward, and taking in the situation at a
glance, sent back his cousin with orders to Colonel Coode for the Black
Watch to reinforce on their right.
Young Wauchope gave the order; then returned to the General’s
side, only to find him dead. A
moment later the devoted aide-de-camp fell also.
Colonel Coode too, as he gallantly led his men to the right in
compliance with the order was killed immediately.
Colonel Hughes-Hallet, the only commanding officer now unscathed,
promptly doubled out the Seaforth Highlanders to the right, in the wake of
the Black Watch. The men of
the two regiments soon became inextricably mixed up, but they resolutely
rushed on, and small detachments, breaking through a gap in the Boer
trenches at the eastern extremity of the hill, gained a footing on the
lower slopes. But they were
forced to fall back, being caught now between the rifles of the enemy on
their right and the shrapnel of the British guns, which had just opened
fire.
A Curious Incident
There
was a curious incident some minuets after the burghers opened fire from
their hithero-concealed trenches. Several
men of the Black Watch and Seaforth Highlanders doubling out to the right
had got close up to the Boer Trenches, crawling though a wire fence, only
to be stopped somewhat farther on by another similar obstacle. Captain Mcfarlane, of the Royal Highlanders, led a party of
25 men up the south face of the hill, but fired on heavily by the Boers,
he was eventually driven back by the Shrapnel of our own guns.
Lieutenant Coxx, of the Seaforth Highlanders, with four men,
actually climbed the hill, but all five were killed.
Another party rushed along under the base of the hill, and had not
Cronje appeared at the moment, might have been followed by other gallant
men, and have taken the Boer trenches in reverse.
The Boer General slept in his cloak in the heavy rain on
Magersfontein Hill until 1 a.m. when he rode to the left of the trenches
to ensure that the burghers were in position and o the alert.
The Commandant and the six, members of his staff lost their way in
the darkness and pouring rain, and eventually got back again near the foot
of Magersfontein Hill, and took cover when the bullets whistled over their
heads during the attack. One
of the Boer Staff caught sight of the little party of Highlanders climbing
in the hill and pointed them out to Cronje, who with his companions
emptied their magazines on their assailants.
Some Boers lying in the trenches a little to the easts of the hill,
now running up drove the Highlanders back.
The situation became like that at Modder River.
To advance was impossible, but the troops would not retire.
So the infantry, with dogged determination, lay just where they
were, waiting for the guns to come up from the rear to their assistance
and maintain the battle.
Day had barely broken when the guns opened fire, and, despite the
ill-effect which the first shells had on Hughes-Hallett’s advance, they
did good working keeping down the enemy’s fire, the howitzers a 3,500
yards and the big naval gun plying the hill lyddite, while the field
batteries opened at 2,500 yards.
Towards 6 a.m. the 18th Battery moved forward to within
1,400 yards of the trench and was after joined by the 62nd, the
two batteries remaining in this position throughout the day.
The 75th Battery assisted in checking the efforts made
by the Boers, entrenched to the southeast of Magersfontein Hill, to
enfilade the right of the Highlanders.
A
Dangerous Position
After the night attack ha failed, the position of this exposed right
flank became dangerous; and it was due almost entirely to the
unconventional use which General Babington made of his Cavalry, and to the
fire of the mounted infantry, that the Highland Brigade was not crumpled
up within an hour of daybreak.
Seeing that the Boers were threatening Hughes-Hallett’s flank, he
brought up the 12th Lancers and the Mounted Infantry, under
Lord Airlie and Major Milton, dismounted them, and sent them into the
firing line on the right of the highlanders.
Later the cold stream and Grenadier Guards came up and relieved the
pressure at this point. The
Lancers then returned to their horses.
Lord Metheun learned almost at once of the disaster, which had
befallen the Highland Brigade.
That such a thing might happen he had not it seems even
contemplated. He had no plan
ready for retrieving the disaster; and although, including the 2nd
Gordon Highlanders, there were five battalions available, he did not send
one forward to the assistance of the stricken brigade.
He directed Sir H Covile, however to take the Guards due east
towards a low, bushy ridge facing the extreme left of the Boer position,
instructing him not to advance beyond the ridge, but there to hold himself
I readiness to cover, if necessary the retirement of the whole force.
The Cold Streams in the Firing Line
The Cold Stream Guards, as has
already been stated, subsequently replaced the Lancers in the firing line.
Colvile, however, made no effort to break through the enemy’s
line. Yet, according at any
rate to Boer, accounts it must have succeeded, for the burghers on the
left showed unsteadiness throughout the morning, and it was all the
commandants could do to keep them in the half finished trenches.
An aggressive movement, on the part of Pole-Crew could hardly of
failed to bring relief to the Highland Brigade on the other flank. Had Pole-Carew pushed on, and occupied the little hill which
rises immediately to the east of the railway, at the point where the
enemy’s line bent back sharply to the north-west, we would have been
able to enfilade the whole of the Boer trenches in the centre.
Lord Methuen could not, from where he was occupied, realise the
advantage of such an attack; and Pole-Carew did not advance because he had
been ordered merely to demonstrate against the enemy’s right and to him
had been entrusted the safety of the camp at Modder River.
From 6 to 11 a.m. therefore the battle remained stationary,
Methuen’s idea being that his men should hold that his men should hold o
till night, when he hoped that the Boers, as happened at Modder River,
would become demoralised, and retire under cover of darkness.
The General, endowed by Nature with great personal courage and
endurance, did not apparently fully understand what he was asking the
shaken Highland Brigade to do. At
11 o’clock it had already hung on for more than six hours in a very
trying position. Hungry and thirsty, moreover, the men were now suffering from
a burning African sun. Most
of their officers had been wither killed or wounded; and every main the
ranks had long become convinced that he could do no good by remaining
those exposed within easy range of good shots in those hidden trenches,
and their determination perceptibly began to weaken.
At 112 a.m. Lord Methuen, seeing that the centre of the line was
wavering, sent forward reinforcements-six companies of the 2nd
Gordon Highlanders, under Colonel Downman.
The Gordon’s advanced in widely extended order, and by a series
of conducted rushes, succeeded, despite the galling fire, which greeted
them, in getting within 400 yards of the enemy’s trenches.
It was a fine effort, but useless.
Six companies in broad daylight could not hope to carry the
position. The companies would
have had a greater steadiness influence on those they tried to support had
they been halted at 800 yards from the trenches.
Intense Strain on Highlan
ders
Thus,
although the advance of the Gordon’s gave a temporary encouragement, it
did nothing really to relieve the strain on the Highland Brigade, and that
strain was rapidly approaching a breaking point, especially on the right
flank, where, throughout the morning, the struggle had been swaying
backwards and forwards. By
midday, so intense had the strain at this point become that Hughes-Hallet
twice sent messengers to General Colvile urging him to send forward
reinforcements.
Neither of the messengers, however, succeeded in delivering the
message, and at 1.30 p.m. Hughes-Hallett was compelled to throw back his
right as the only means of checking the Boers, who, advancing, were now
making an effort to enfilade the scattered brigade.
Colonel Downman, who at the time was lying in n the very front of
the firing line, more than two miles away, saw the right come back, and,
knowing that Hughes-Hallett was acting as Brigadier, assumed that a
general retirement was intended to a less deadly range.
Downman was unaware that Lord Methuen had told Hughes-Hallett to
hold on at all cost until nightfall.
He ordered his men; therefore, to retire towards the guns; and the
whole of the line conformed to the movement.
Captain Towse V.C.
At first the men fell back in good order.
But as they retreated, the storm of fire from the enemy’s
trenches broke forth with increased effect, and the Highlanders ran,
suffering severely. Downman
was among the first to fall, being mortally wounded ad he raised in the
firing line. Captain Towse, of the Gordon’s, however, stood by the side
till Sergeant Nelson and Lance-Corporal Hodgson came to his aid helped him
carry back his Colonel under heavy fire.
For his conspicuous gallantry on this occasion and on April 30th,
1900, when he was terribly wounded, Captain Towse received the Victoria
Cross.
When the men of the highland brigade began to retire it was
impossible to rally them, Colonel Hughes-Hallett an other officers did all
they could, but the men had had enough, and fell back rapidly, even beyond
the guns, which for a time were left exposed to attack.
An effort to reform was made.
“The men,” according to one vivid narrative, “were dazed by
what they had undergone, and Nature shrank back from that deadly zone
where the bullets fell so thickly. But
the pipes blew, and the bulges sang, and the dispirited men, the backs of
their legs so flayed and blistered by lying in the sun that they could
hardly bend them, hobbled back their duty.”
But just then the Boer guns, which, which for some reason
unexplained, had remained silent all day, suddenly opened fire.
The first shells burst in the midst of the rallying crowd.
A moment later, the sorely tried men were in full retreat across
the plain, and the brigade, as such, was not re-formed until after dusk.
This final route came as a bitter disappointment to Lord Methuen.
Up to thsat time he had hoped that the highland Brigade might yet
hold its position until nightfall, and so enable him to retrieve the
fortunes of the battle by another attack on Magersfontein Hill at early
dawn.
After some desultory skirmishing on the right the long days action
came gradually to an end. The
howitzers and naval gun continued-but slowly than before-to shell the
enemy’s lines, but after 4 p.m. there was no fighting; and the British
troops, who with the exception of the Highland Brigade still held their
position, sank exhausted to the ground.
Many men fell sleep, lulled by the thunder of the guns, and woke
only to find the sun setting and the firing at an end.
But for the Medical corps no rest was possible.
They had been busy all day. They
were busy all night. Their
quiet courage and devotion is deserving of the highest praise; Lord
Methuen freely acknowledged it in his dispatches.
At dawn, when General Colvile
repaired to headquarters for instructions, he found Lord Methuen proposed
an immediate retirement on Modder River camp.
General Colvile was avers to this course.
He maintained that there was still a hope of the Boers abandoning
their positions, but the general opinion of the Staff was in favour of a
retirement.
In the view of this, Lord Methuen adhered to his original
intention, and at noon the entire force withdrew.
The British casualties at the
battle of Magerfontein amounted to 971, of whom 201 were killed, 23 being
officers. The bulk of the
loss naturally fell on the unfortunate Highlanders, who, excluding the
Gordon’s, lost 46 officers and 706 men killed and wounded.
The Boer losses were about 250.
A
night attack is proverbially a difficult and hazardous operation.
Most soldiers will, therefore, hold that the General’s
persistence in the operation under very unfavourable weather conditions
was an error, and the less excusable in that Kimberley, only 20 miles
distant, had still six weeks food supply. And the blunder was the more unfortunate in that it had the
effect of breaking up, to all intents and purposes, the Highland Brigade,
whose oft-proved courage has been the envy of all armies of the world.
